INTRODUCTION THE ROYAL FAMILY'S ARRIVAL AND THE 1988 CONSTITUTION
Brazil lagged sorely behind until 1808. It was only three hundred years after its discovery 1 , with the arrival of the Portuguese royal family, that Brazil began to develop a sense of national identity 2 . Until then, the ports served Portugal exclusively. Local manufacturing was prohibited by Portuguese authorities, as was the construction of roads. There were no high-level education institutions, only elementary schools run by the Catholic Church. More than 98% of the Brazilian population was illiterate, and in the absence of currency, bartering was the order of the day. One out of every three persons was a slave, and slavery would persist for yet another eighty years 3 , a moral smear and ominous social ticking bomb. While the industrial revolution spread elsewhere, we were chained to a backward colonial power lost in time and history, where religious injunctions limited scientific and medical advances and the economy continued to be entirely dependent on raw material extraction and trade with its colonies. Portugal was the last country in Europe to abolish the inquisition, the slave trade and absolutism. Stubbornly conservative and authoritarian, the Portuguese empire resisted the libertarian ideas then flourishing in America and Europe. With independence from Portugal in 1822, Brazil's constitutional history finally began. It was a bad start, to say the least. On November 12, 1823, Dom Pedro I, the heir to the Portuguese throne and emperor of Brazil since its independence, dissolved the General Constitutional and Legislative Assembly that had been convened to draft Brazil's first constitution. 5 This was not entirely unpredictable.
It was indeed a bad start. Fortunately, we have come a long way since then. Two hundred years separate the arrival of the Portuguese royal family in Brazil and the celebration of the 20 th anniversary of the Constitution of 1988. In the meantime, the once exotic and semi-abandoned colony turned into one of the ten most properous economies in the world. The formerly authoritarian Empire based on a monarchic charter, became a democratic and stable constitutional State, where opposing parties routinely vie for the presidency and political crises are resolved according to the rule of law. On the other hand, our heritage of slavery bestowed on Brazil a rich racial and cultural diversity, capable of overcoming -albeit with some difficultypersistent prejudice and discrimination. It is true thar our history is fraught with accidents. Since our Independence, we have had eight constitutional Charters: 1824, 1891, 1934, 1937, 1946, 1967, 1969 and 1988 , in a dismal pattern of instability and a lack of continuity in our political institutions. The Constitution of 1988 represents the culmination of this long trajectory, catalyzing the efforts of many generations of Brazilians to overcome the authoritarianism, social exclusion and patrimonialism that characterized our early nationhood.
11 It has not always been smooth sailing, but there are various reasons to celebrate our journey so far. 12 The military movement that began on March 31, 1964 with President João Goulart's ouster 13 had initially promised to hold the presidential elections scheduled for the following year, but failed to honor this commitment. After consistently suspending the political rights of various leaders, including those of Juscelino Kubitschek, the favorite candidate in the canceled election, a series of institutional acts 14 were issued to dissolve all political parties 15 and prolong the term of Marshall Castello Branco, Brazil's first president under the military regime. November 29, 1979 , when the party system was restructured and the multi-party system restored. 16 Ato Institucional No. 3, de 05 de fevereito de 1966 (Br.), which scheduled October 3, 1966 as the date for the presidential election. Strictly speaking, the postponement had already been stipulated in AI 2, and this Act merely set a new date. AI 3 also made elections for state governors and mayors of state capitals Within strict deadlines and under great pressure from the executive branch, a Congress which lacked real independence or leadership approved in 1967 the draft of a new constitution sent in by the military government 17 . This constitution did not curb the rise of hard-liners within the Armed Forces, nor did it contain the dictatorship that eventually defeated the growing democratic resistance in various state capitals. 19 AI 5 allowed the President of the Republic to impose the recess of the National Congress, the Legistative Assemblies of the States and the City Councils [Câmaras Municipais], taking over full legislative powers for himself; to decree federal intervention in the States and Municipalities notwithstanding the limits set forth in the Constitution; to suspend the political rights of any citizen for ten years and to cancel the terms of elected officials on the federal, state and municipal levels. It also suspended the constitutional and legal guarantees of judges and other public servants, who became subject to removal from office, by means of firing and forced transfer and retirement.. It also suspended the guarantee of habeas corpus, and excluded any acts based on the AI 5 from judicial scrutiny.. 20 The Constitution of 1969 was approved under the formal label of Emenda Constitucional [Constitutional Amendment] No. 1, de 17 de outubro de 1969 (Br.). Without denying its authorship, the Constitution's preamble began with the following wording: "The Ministers of the Navy, Army and Air Force...". Next, the preamble explains that the constitutional power was being exercised based on Institutional Acts No. 16 and No. 5, and due to the fact that a recess of the National Congress had been decreed. dictatorship flourished through urban and rural guerrilla warfare. 21 The systematic torturing of political prisoners left an indelible and everlasting moral stain on Brazil's history. 22 A "slow, gradual and safe" democratic transition.
Part I FROM MILITARY REGIME TO CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY I. THE LONG JOURNEY 1. 1964-1985: the rise and fall of the military regime
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Although showing ocasional demonstrations of dictatorial power, 24 Geisel used his authority to defeat resistance to the transition among the extreme hardliners and pockets of radical anti-communist groups within the Armed Forces. 25 33 Military personnel linked to the Department of Information Operations of the 1st Army in Rio de Janeiro organized an attack consisting of placing bombs at a location where a show of popular Brazilian music promoted by leftist organizations was being performed. One of the bombs exploded in the vehicle where the two soldiers were sitting, killing one and wounding the other. 34 By 480 votes to 180, Tancredo Neves, of the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), defeated Paulo Maluf, candidate of the Social Democratic Party candidate (PDS), which was the party that supported the military government, successor to the Alliance of National Renewal (ARENA).
The military regime gave way to the New Republic and Brazil returned to civilian rule. A moderate opponent of the dictatorship, Tancredo Neves had enough support to lead a peaceful transition to democracy, but he became ill on the eve of his inauguration and passed away on April 21, 1985. José Sarney, a prominent member of the exiting regime who had hastened its downfall by joining the opposition, became the first civilian President since 1964.
Convening and nature of the Constitutional Assembly
Complying with Tancredo Neves' campaign promise, President José Sarney sent to Congress a proposal to convene a constitutional assembly. Approved as Constitutional Amendment no. 26, of 11.27.1985, the proposal called for "the members of the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate" to meet in a free and sovereign National Constitutional Assembly. 35 Once inaugurated by the President of the Federal Supreme Court, José Carlos Moreira Alves, on February 1, 1987, the Constitutional Assembly elected as its President Deputy Ulysses Guimarães, the military regime's leading opponent in Congress. The assembly included members of Congress chosen in an election held on November 15, 1986, as well as senators elected four years earlier whose terms of office were still underway. All together, 559 members -487 federal deputies and 72 senatorssat in a single chamber.
As the wording of EC (Constitutional Amendment) 26/85 suggested, civil society's plan for a temporary constitutional assembly to be dissolved after the conclusion of its work did not prevail. 36 On the contrary, the drafting prerogative was extended to members of both houses of the Congress, including senators who had not been elected for that specific purpose. Constitution drafting was thus more strongly affected by current political interests. In practice, there was no distinction between constitution-drafting and law making, or constitutional politics and ordinary politics. 37 We had a Constitutional Congress instead of a Constitutional Assembly.
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This circumstance had a clear impact on the Constitutional Assembly's work, which ultimately included many topics better suited for ordinary legislation. Since the Constitutional Assembly was born of a constitutional amendment, some argue that the Constitution of 1988 was neither the work of a true constitutional convention (the pouvoir constituent originaire) nor the expression of the sovereign will of the people, but rather, the reform of the previous Charter. 39 This view does not seem appropriate. Constitutional power is a political fact, consisting of the ability to draft a constitution recognized as valid and legitimate. It is situated at the meeting point of law and politics and its legitimacy rests on popular sovereignty. In fact, constitutional change is often associated with moments of great civic engagement and demands for a new concept of law and individual rights. This was no doubt the case of Brazil in 1984 and 1985, when calls for an end to the military regime, direct elections and a new constitutional system intensified. The formal amendment mechanism signaled greater respect for the sovereign will of the people, which is, after all, the legitimate source of constitution-making power. 
The work of drafting the constitution
Following his election and prior to his expected inauguration, Tancredo Neves announced his intention to appoint a committee of renowned citizens who would be in charge of preparing the draft of a constitution in the form of a bill of law to be sent to the Constitutional Assembly. Despite the president-elect's death, José Sarney convened the committee, 41 consisting of fifty members under the leadership of jurist Afonso Arinos de Mello Franco. 42 The "Arinos Committee", as it became known, produced an innovative text that could have been a good starting point for the constitutional assembly. 43 Instead, it was received with much opposition. At the time, President Sarney did not have sufficient political clout to send it to Congress and besides, he disliked the bill's option for a parliamentary system of government. 41 Due to the special conditions under which he took office and the fragile moment of political transition, President Sarney was subject, especially at the beginning of his administration, to two contingencies. The first was to preserve all the political decisions and appointments already announced by Tancredo Neves. The second was to accept the role of preeminence performed by Ulysses Guimarães, President of the PMDB party, who was the political guarantor of his taking office, when doubts were raised about the legitimacy of his inauguration. Ulysses, who would later be chosen President of the Constitutional Assembly, exercised great influence in the administration's political decisions. 42 On the other hand, the prominent President of the Assembly, Ulysses Guimarães, refused to use a text that had not been prepared by the Constitutional Assembly, for he wanted to coordinate the drafting of the bill himself. 44 Bereft of political support, the Arinos Committee's bill was sent to the Constitutional Assembly merely as a contribution and was practically ignored.
With no draft as a basis for discussion, the work of the Constitutional Assembly progressed in three major stages: (i) Thematic Committees; (ii) Systematization Committee; and (iii) Plenary. The drafting process began with the formation of eight Thematic Committees 45 further divided into three subcommittees, for a total of 24.
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The Subcommittees' reports were consolidated by the Thematic Committees, which then sent a first draft of the constitution to the Systematization Committee. The draft that prevailed in the Systematization Committee 47 was fairly leftist due to the influence of Deputy Mário Covas and his progressive colleagues in the PMDB party. 48 Indeed, it was quite nationalistic, providing for comprehensive state intervention in the economy and broad protection for workers' rights. This fact motivated a response in the plenary session, when liberal-conservative forces formed "Centro Democrático" [ 
II. BRAZILIAN DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION 1. The Institutional Success of the Constitution of 1988
The Constitution of 1988 is a high symbol of Brazil's success story, for it made possible the transition from an authoritarian, intolerant and often violent state to a democracy founded on the rule of law. This constitution established universal suffrage and laid the groundwork for five direct presidential elections, broad popular debate and participation in politics, and access to power for all political parties. Above all, the constitution guaranteed two decades of institutional stability in Brazil, even through turbulent times. During this period, the country was rocked by various crises that, in the past, would have surely triggered an institutional collapse. For example, the first president elected after the military dictatorship was impeached amidst accusations of corruption. More recently, the legislative branch was shaken when evidence surfaced of fraud in the preparation of the government budget, violations of confidentiality of the electronic voting panel of the Congress, and finally, the "mensalão", i.e. large monthly payoff of certain members of Congress to obtain pro-government votes. Scandals notwithstanding, nothing other than constitutional legality was ever -of the historical moment of its birth and of the aspirations that it should be the instrument of: "We, representatives of the Brazilian people, gathered together in a National Constitutional Assembly to institute a Democratic State, destined to guarantee the exercise of social and individual rights, liberty, safety, well being, development, equality and justice as the supreme values of a fraternal and pluralist society without prejudices, founded on social harmony and committed, internally and internationally, to the peaceful solution of disputes, hereby promulgate, under the protection of God, the following Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil". 52 Traditionally, the Brazilian Constitutions, since the time of the Empire, began with the organization of the States and the Branches, not with a declaration of rights. 53 The Public Ministry is an institution that embodies the roles of public prosecution and defense of collective rights and interests. 
The Constitution of 1988 was Brazil's rite of passage to institutional maturity. In the next twenty one years, the country overcame formidable obstacles: now there are periodic elections, presidents serve full terms or are ousted according to the constitution, Congress functions without interruption, the Judiciary is free and active and the armed forces no longer meddle in politics. After decades of shadow, it is quite easy to appreciate the light.
The Fernando Collor and Itamar Franco administrations 55
The Sarney government lasted little over a year after the adoption of the constitution, 54 To guarantee Goulart's taking office, a formula of compromise was adopted: a constitutional amendment was hurriedly approved instituting the parliamentary system with the purpose of weakening the power of the president. The parliamentary system never worked in practice and its defeat in a referendum in 1963 merely increased the political tension. 55 increasing in intensity in the first semester of 1992, a private dispute between the president's brother, Pedro Collor, and the treasurer of Collor's electoral campaign, Paulo Cesar "PC" Farias, sparked a wave of accusations and revealed a universe of power brokering and lavish corruption implicating the president directly. On June 1, 1992, a Congressional Investigation Committee (CPI) was formed and would soon gather highly incriminating testimonies. On August 22 nd , Congress approved the Committee's final report, which concluded that the president had received 6.5 million dollars from the so-called "Esquema PC" (PC Scheme) and recommended his impeachment. 62 The impeachment proceeding is governed by Lei No. 1.079, de 10 de abril de 1950 (Br.), which defines crimes of responsibility and governs the respective judgment process. Art. 14 of the law states that "any citizen" -and, therefore, not public bodies or private entities -can denounce the President of the Republic or Minister of State for a crime of responsibility, in the Chamber of Deputies. 63 According to the Constitution, accusations against the president for "crimes of responsibility" are to be admitted by the Chamber of Deputies. In case of admission, the president temporarily steps down and the Federal Senate must decide whether or not to impeach him or her. The accusation for "common crimes" must also be admitted by the Chamber, but are subject to trial by the Federal Supreme Court. 64 IMPEACHMENT (1996) , MS 21.689-DF, Reported by Justice Carlos Velloso. By majority vote, the STF felt that the penalties of loss of office and political rights for eight years were independent and that, as a result, his letter of resignation, which was presented during the trial session, after the latter had already begun, did not have the effect of suspending the impeachment proceeding. 66 
317). For a political and technical critique of that decision, see EVANDRO LINS E SILVA, O SALÃO DOS PASSOS PERDIDOS [THE SALON OF LOST FOOTSTEPS] (1997).
midst of a severe economic crisis, with inflation soaring to 1,100% in 1992 and 2,484% the next year. 67 After several staff changes in the Ministry of Finance, President Itamar appointed Fernando Henrique Cardoso, then Minister of Foreign Relations, as the Minister of Finance. In February 1994, the government launched the Real Plan, the first national economic stabilization strategy that produced long-term results, which enabled Brazil to finally keep inflation under control. Encouraged by the remarkable success of his Real Plan, Fernando Henrique Cardoso decided to run for president through the PSDB -Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (Brazilian Social Democracy Party) and was elected on October 3, 1994, defeating the Workers' Party candidate, Luís Inácio Lula da Silva. With Cardoso in office, the generation of intellectuals and activists persecuted by the military regime had finally risen to power.
3. The Fernando Henrique Cardoso Administration 68 Fernando Henrique Cardoso was elected in the first round, with an absolute majority of votes on October 3, 1994, and took office on January 1, 1995. During his first term, the controversial Constitutional Amendment no. 16 of 6/4/1997 was approved, which in contrast to Brazil's republican tradition, allowed for the president's re-election. 69 Cardoso was in fact re-elected on October 4, 1998, once again in the first round, defeating Luís Inácio Lula da Silva for a second time. He remained in office until December 31, 2002. 70 During his presidencies, Cardoso consolidated economic stability, even at the cost of high interest rates and periods of recession, lowered the public deficit, and made economic and administrative reforms that substantially changed the role of the state in the economy. Fernando Henrique governed against fierce opposition from the left and especially from the PT Party, which condemned the privatizing of state-owned companies, the opening of the country to international investment and the adoption of public policies recommended by the "Washington Consensus." 71 In fact, successive constitutional amendments reduced restrictions on foreign capital, 72 made state monopolies more flexible, 73 and alongside sweeping common legislation, made Cardoso's extensive privatization program possible. In this process, numerous nationally-owned companies were privatized, from resource extraction businesses (steel and mining) to the provision of public services, such as communications and electricity. Concessions for other important public services, such as highway construction and maintenance, were sold to private companies according to newly approved legislation. 74 The state's new limited role in the economy was counterbalanced with the creation of several independent regulatory agencies. ) , against stiff opposition, modified the retirement rules, both in the private sector (general regimen, art. 201) and the public sector (specific regimen for government employees, art. 40). This Reform Amendment introduced substantive innovation in calculating the time for retirement, replacing the "time of service" criterion with the "time of contribution" criterion, in addition to establishing a minimum age for acquiring the right to retire. 78 Emenda Constitucional No. 19, de 04 de junho de 1998 (Br.), created a new mechanism for payment of government employees, re-established the salary ceiling and attempted to make public employee stability more flexible. None of these measures has produced the impact on Public Administration's structure and spending that was expected. 79 In January 1999, on the heels of the crises that occurred in other Latin American countries, like Ecuador and Argentina, Brazil suffered a serious economic blow when the Stock Exchange plummeted significantly and the real was the target of speculative attack, generating a loss of foreign exchange and drastic currency devaluation.
Despite his popularity and undoubtedly positive impact, Fernando Henrique Cardoso could not usher in a hand-picked successor. The PSDB candidate, José Serra, an important member of the outgoing administration who served as Minister of Planning and of Health, was defeated by the PT candidate Luís Inácio Lula da Silva. In his fourth campaign for the presidency, the labor union leader who had helped to organize workers at the end of the military regime and founded Brazil's militant leftist party finally became president.
The Luís Inácio Lula da Silva Administration
Lula began his administration on January 1, 2003, hailed as a humble but obstinate worker who achieved success despite formidable obstacles and stinging losses. Although a product of the political left and its grassroot movements, President Lula moved to the center during his final campaign in order to draw support from the urban middle class and the international community. 80 To the surprise of his adversaries and disappointment of his allies, Lula's administration then embraced an orthodox monetary policy, meant to further economic stability, control inflation, and give the Central Bank autonomy, despite complaints of growing fiscal negligence. The administration succeeded in having Congress approve, albeit at the cost of losing part of his support base, 81 a new and equally key Social Security Reform Amendment, reducing the imbalance between private and public sector pensions.
82 After a stalemate of ten years, the long awaited Judicial Reform was also approved, leading to the creation of the National Council of Justice and passage of procedural measures, such as binding precedent (súmula vinculante) 83 and a type of writ of certiorari (repercussão geral).
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On the social program front, Lula's Fome Zero (Zero Hunger) food distribution program was a dismal operational failure, so his administration expanded other important programs, with good results, such as the Bolsa Familia (Family Grant Program), which rewarded very poor families for sending their children to school. In the economy, President Lula successfully reduced poverty and boosted the minimum wage, practically eliminating the foreign debt and earning the trust of foreign investors. 85 But like his predecessor, Lula encountered implacable opposition, which spearheaded However, except for a short period of time, the president succeeded in distancing himself from the PT's loss of prestige and his popularity remained relatively intact. On October 29, 2006, he was re-elected, defeating PSDB candidate Geraldo Alckmin. His second administration began with the launching of the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC) in January 2007 amid a growing worldwide economic crisis triggered by the American mortgage fall-out and record increases in oil prices. By mid-2008, it was clear that this crisis would have fairly limited repercussions in Brazil. Also in 2008, proposals to modify the constitution so as to allow Lula to run for a third term were hotly debated but rebuffed both by civil society and Lula himself. In a democracy as young as Brazil's, the regular change of administrations remains an essential symbol to be preserved.
PART II THE PERFORMANCE OF THE INSTITUTIONS
This section analyzes the performance of Brazil's three branches during the twenty one years that our constitution has been effective. It briefly examines some of the constitutional changes that affected the role of each branch, as well as the performance of the Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches in their constitutional roles. It is easy to identify the persistence of Brazil's tradition of presidential hegemony, despite the recovery of political space by the legislative branch, which is experiencing a serious crisis of legitimacy in any case. Perhaps the most visible characteristic of Brazil's recent political landscape is the institutional ascension of the judicial branch, which has played a decisive role in several historical political events, ranging from constitutional reforms to criminal cases involving high-ranking government officials.
I. EXECUTIVE BRANCH
I will examine below the structure and role of the executive branch since 1988, with particular emphasis on the continuation of the presidential form of government, reduction of the president's term of office, possibility of presidential re-election, creation of the Ministry of Defense and two presidential powers that have been abused: the power to issue provisional measures and the possibility of retaining funds, thus halting congressionally authorized expenditures.
Both the Arinos Committee's preliminary draft and the version submitted by the Systematization Committee proposed a parliamentary system of government. This suggestion was defeated in a Plenary Session of the constitutional assembly with the support of President Sarney and others political leaders who aspired to win the presidency in the 1989 elections. To achieve a compromise, Art. 2 of the ADCT was approved, calling for a public referendum to be held to determine Brazil's system of government. In April 21, 1993, a wide majority voted for the continuation of the presidential system (see above). Ironically, the PT, PDT and PMDB parties, whose candidates expected to outperform their rivals in 1994 elections (Lula, Leonel Brizola and Orestes Quércia, respectively) supported the presidential cause. The PSDB party of Mário Covas and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, which had no strong candidate for president at the time, unsuccessfully defended the parliamentary system. However, Fernando Henrique luckily became the main beneficiary of the model his party opposed: imperial presidentialism, Brazilian-style.
In the first semester of 1994, the ambitious project that was intended to make sweeping changes to the constitution, as established in Art. 3 of the ADCT 87 , ended up having only six less controversial constitutional revision amendments (ECRs) approved. ECR no. 5, of 6.09.1994, for example, reduced the president's term of office established in Art. 82 of the constitution from five years to four. This occurred during Itamar Franco's final year in office. Later, amidst a fierce debate during the Cardoso administration, EC no. 16 of 6.05.1997 was approved, now making it possible for the president, governors and mayors to be re-elected once. Also worthy of note was the creation of the Ministry of Defense within the executive branch's structure by EC no. 23 of 9/30/1999, an important symbol of the military's respect for civilian rule 88 .
The executive branch frequently misused two instruments that deserve special attention in a review of the past two decades. The first is the abuse of provisional measures. Originally conceived as an exceptional tool for the President to exercise legislative authority and reserved for cases of "relevance and urgency" (Art. 62 of the Constitution), the provisional measures became routinely employed by the executive branch to discipline all sorts of trivial issues, thus minimizing the role of Congress and often compromising the transparency and public debate that should precede innovations of the legal system. In light of the tolerance exhibited by the legislative and judicial branches, 89 approximately 6,000 provisional measures were issued between 1988 and 2002. 90 Use of PMs only declined after the passage of EC no. 32, of 9/12/2001, which limited their validity to a maximum of 60 days, renewable once only for another 60 days, in which PMs await the approval by Congress. If no decision is reached in forty-five days, all other legislation is suspended until the PM was voted on. The second instrument abused by the executive branch involved the retention or impounding of appropriated funds by the President. In fact, the making of the annual budget, followed by the collection of revenues and payment of expenses, constitutes a large segment of any democracy, but one that is often neglected in Brazil. 91 The powers of the executive branch are already at their maximum when preparing the proposal of budget being sent to Congress, since the administration has the most acurate data to estimate revenues and expenses. Once the budget proposal is sent to Congress, lawmakers' powers to change it are limited 92 , and therefore, their efforts usually focus on local state interests and favoring friends in government contracts instead of promoting a comprehensive debate on the bill. Worst of all, according to the prevailing interpretation, the approved budget consists merely of an authorization to spend, rather than of an obligation of any kind. It follows that the President, at his discretion and without accountability, can decide for a contingency and refuse to release funds without any perspective of congressional reaction. Except for those transfers of funds required by the constitution -to the Legislature, the Judiciary and the Public Ministry, for example -all other funding projects are implemented if and when the President so desires, despite the approval of the budget by the Congress.
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II. LEGISLATIVE BRANCH Within Brazil's new democratic structure, the legislative branch seems to have recovered many of its prerogatives, although its diminished importance in the legislative process remains visible. On the other hand, its powers of oversight and investigation have expanded. Also worth mentioning are certain structural and functional weaknesses in Brazil's political system that have hindered politicians' legitimacy and representation powers.
During the military regime, the legislative branch suffered most from the consequences of authoritarian rule. Indeed, many of its members lost their political rights between 1964 and 1977. Congress was shut down several times and all legislative powers were transferred to the general/president, including the power of ) 95 .
An important structural problem in Brazil's electoral system which affects the composition of the legislative branch, is the disproportional political representation that exists in the Chamber of Deputies. Art. 45, par. 1, of the Constitution calls for at least eight and no more than seventy deputies from each state. As a result, densely populated states are under-represented and sparsely populated states are over-represented. This means that the votes of Sao Paulo and Roraima citizens carry different weights and undermines the principle of "one-man-one vote". 96 These limits could technically be justified by federative balance considerations, 97 but this is not the case in Brazil due to the principle of parity in the Senate whereby every state elects three senators.
From the standpoint of proportionality, the problem is that the number of seats in Congress is also reflected in the weight carried by political parties within the Chamber of Deputies, distorting fair participation. This issue is hardly trivial. ECR no. 6 of 6/9/1994 established that a congressman's resignation after the start of an investigation that could lead to their removal from office would not prevent the house of congress in question from making its final decision in the case.
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With regards to congressional procedural immunity, EC no. 35 of 12/21/2001 introduced a substantial change, no longer requiring prior permission from the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate to initiate criminal prosecution of congressmen. Under the new regime, the Federal Supreme Court can address the accusation directly. However, by majority vote and before a final decision is rendered, the Chamber or the Senate may suspend the law suit during the remainder of the member's term of office, also suspending the statute of limitations.
On the twenty first anniversary of its constitution, Brazil is experiencing a delicate phase where political activity has lost much prestige. 101 A serious crisis in the representation system is compromising the democratic legitimacy of our legislative institutions. In this context, it is impossible to ignore the lack of coordination . 101 Reflecting this sentiment, the president of the Federal Senate and the National Congress, in an interview with VEJA MAGAZINE, Apr. 2, 2008, at 13, 14, declared as follows: "The Congress failed to legislate, to vote, to perform its function. It is slow agony that is reaching a point of culmination. This issue of provisional measures is emblematic of the crisis of the Legislative Branch, which is no longer a voice of society, but more of and no longer a loud speaker of public opinion. It is somewhat without a function. The Congress is in Intensive Care, and no one in the political world perceives that this depreciation by the Legislative Branch is something that is eating away at its bases of support (...). Today, the Congress only wants to act as an overseer of other branches, through CPIs, but forgets that it must first clean its own house". between civil society and popular representative bodies that is inexorably tied to a political model failing to adequately serve the country. It is high time we promoted some political reform in order to boost democratic legitimacy, governability and republican virtues. I will return to this issue later.
III. JUDICIAL BRANCH
In the past twenty one years, the Judiciary has become increasingly involved in Brazil's institutional landscape. Today it is no longer ignored, viewed with indifference or kept at arm's length, for various reasons. The judicial branch's active role is due first to Brazil's reconstitutionalization: once the democratic liberties and judicial guarantees were restored, judges and courts no longer acted like a specialized technical department and began to play a more prominent political role, sharing power with the legislative and executive branches. Secondly, there has been a greater demand for justice in Brazilian society. In fact, under the Constitution of 1988, civic awareness was revitalized in Brazil, with people more conscious of their role in furthering their own interests. In addition, the constitution created new rights and actions, broadening legal capacity to sue and collective court protection. In this environment, judges and courts play a heightened symbolic role in the national psyche.
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In addition to strengthening the Judiciary and increasing demand for justice, other factors elevated the role of judges and courts to a central position in contemporary public life. The broadening of the constitution's scope, the adoption of both European and American styles of judicial review, as well as the constitutionalization of law, all triggered a visible phenomenon in contemporary Brazil: the judicialization of political and social relationships. Judicialization should not be confused with usurpation of the political sphere by judicial authorities, but rather, means that many controversial constitutional matters are now addressed through lawsuits, i.e. complaints involving individual or collective rights, as well as direct constitutional actions. 103 The Supreme Court and other judicial bodies have thus had the last word on separation of powers issues, fundamental rights, public policy, the constitutionality of economic plans, environmental protection, indigenous lands and even day-to-day problems. This phenomenon is easily proved.
Many government programs and important political decisions, including those expressed in constitutional amendments, have ultimately been decided in actions before the Supreme Court. First of all, the Supreme Court has reinforced its own cannot be disposed of, or the arrest of individuals. 119 The Supreme Court has also established that congressional minorities have the right to convene Investigation Committees and, if the constitutional requirements are met, that right cannot be obstructed by any act or omission of the majority.
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The list gets even longer, including such topics as prohibiting nepotism, limiting the creation of municipalities, ending "fiscal warfare" between states, setting a maximum limit on the salaries of civil servants, revitalizing the writ of injunction, and the constitutionality of the Arbitration Law, among many others. Inevitably, this expansion of the role of the judicial branch, especially the Supreme Court, has sparked debate regarding a possible democratic deficit. It is not my purpose here to delve into this subject, but merely to offer a brief synopsis thereof. The role of the Judiciary, especially the constitutional and supreme courts, should be to safeguard the democratic process and promote constitutional values, overcoming the deficit of legitimacy that exists in the other branches, as the case may be. [But without disqualifying its own role, which would occur if it acted abusively, or with political motives, instead of promoting constitutional principles.] Furthermore, in countries where the democratic tradition is not deeply rooted, the constitutional court is responsible for guaranteeing institutional stability, mediating conflicts between the branches of government or between the latter and the civil society. Its major roles are to safeguard fundamental values and democratic procedures as well as guarantee institutional stability.
Finally, a reference to what the constitution referred to as "functions that are essential to justice." The Public Ministry finally established its political, administrative and financial independence and its broad range of specific functions was recognized. Alongside the Judiciary, it experienced a period of significant institutional enhancement under the Constitution of 1988. In addition to its key role in the criminal process, the Public Ministry is now also responsible for civil and administrative matters, with a strong presence in environmental and consumer protection and administrative morality. In mid-2008, a case was still pending before the Supreme Court regarding the possibility of prosecutors and government attorneys to directly conduct criminal investigations. 121 The Office of the Solicitor General of the Union, in turn, was created by the Constitution of 1988 and implemented as of 1993, 122 consummating the separation between the role of defending society, which is the responsibility of the Public Ministry, and the role of defending the Public Treasury, the job of the Union's attorneys. The office of State Solicitor General is structured in all the units of the federation, which is not the case of the Office of Public Defender, which in many states does not exist or functions under extremely precarious conditions. This fact seriously inhibits access to justice for needy citizens. changes in the practice of politics. Numerous proposals exist on the subject, in spite of the lack of willingness to debate them. One consists of a proposal to adopt a semipresidential system of government for Brazil, such as in France and Portugal; an electoral system like the mixed-district vote formula in effect, for example, in Germany; and a party system based on loyalty, with rules that discourage the proliferation of political parties.
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II. WHAT WE SHOULD CELEBRATE
Democratic constitutionalism was the victorious ideology of the twentieth Century. Contemporary society perceives the institutional arrangement that combines the rule of law (Rechtsstaat) and sovereignty of the people as the best way to achieve the aspirations of modernity: limited power, human dignity, fundamental rights, social justice, tolerance and -who knows? -even happiness. To avoid illusions, it is wise to bear in mind that the great ideas of human kind have taken a relatively long time to materialize into great concrete achievements. The process of building civilizations is much slower than our desire for social progress. Choosing the right direction, however, is usually more important than speed.
Brazil was slow to embrace the winning model, on the eve of the new millennium. It was not too late, though. The past twenty one years do not represent the victory of a specific, concrete constitution, but of an idea, an attitude towards life. Democratic constitutionalism, which has been consolidated among us, brings with it not just a way of looking at the state and the law, but also our ideals about the world in search for justice, brotherhood and goodwill. Notwithstanding the problems inherent to complex historical and dialectic processes, we have gradually freed ourselves from the narrow horizons of an authoritarian and exclusionary past. Along the way, we have experienced the inevitable contradictions in the search for balance between market and politics, private and public, individual interests and collective well being. In the two hundred years that elapsed between the arrival of the Portuguese royal family and the twenty first anniversary of the Constitution of 1988, an eternity has passed.
